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MERLEAU-PONTY AND EMBODIED COGNITIVE SCIENCE 
 
Abstract 
What would the Merleau-Ponty of Phenomenology of Perception have thought of the 
use of his phenomenology in the cognitive sciences? This question raises the issue 
of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the relationship between the sciences and 
philosophy, and of what he took the philosophical significance of his phenomenology 
to be. In this article I suggest an answer to this question through a discussion of 
certain claims made in connection to the “post-cognitivist” approach to cognitive 
science by Hubert Dreyfus, Shaun Gallagher and Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson 
and Eleanor Rosch. I suggest that these claims are indicative of an appropriation of 
Merleau-Ponty’s thought that he would have welcomed as innovative science. 
Despite this, I argue that he would have viewed this use of his work as potentially 
occluding the full philosophical significance that he believed his phenomenological 
investigations to contain. 
 
Introduction 
In the Anglophone world since the 1970s there has been what is sometimes referred 
to as a “naturalistic turn” in philosophy. This has involved a “turning away” from a 
conception of philosophy as consisting principally in a priori methods of conceptual 
analysis, and towards a conception of philosophy as continuous with the natural 
sciences. This turn has been, in significant measure, inspired by the advances in 
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“cognitive science”, the new interdisciplinary science of cognition, where cognition is 
taken in its broad sense to include perception and emotion. 
Theorists in the new interdisciplinary projects of the cognitive sciences take 
themselves to be in the business of constructing the first plausible scientific theory of 
consciousness. Although it has been largely ignored until very recently, interest in 
the phenomenological dimension of cognition has been steadily increasing. Within 
the last two decades the work of Merleau-Ponty has played a particularly prominent 
role in inspiring and guiding the development of a critique of the traditional 
conception of cognitive science as computational analysis and unconscious 
information processing that rests on the idea of the brain as functioning like a 
computer. 
Most readings of Merleau-Ponty’s work as representing a strain of theorizing 
that is consonant with the cognitive sciences have not been particularly concerned 
with exegetical issues in Merleau-Ponty scholarship. It has not been the primary 
intention of these readers to reconstruct his position with exegetical precision (see 
e.g. Gallagher and Zahavi 2007, p.1; Varela, Thompson & Rosch 1991, p.xv). 
Rather, they claim that they are reading him primarily with an interest in the apparent 
convergence between his phenomenological descriptions and the results of 
contemporary cognitive science. The incorporation of his ideas in the context of 
cognitive science tends to position Merleau-Ponty in continuity with developments in 
cognitive science and cognitive science-oriented philosophy of mind. This continuity 
involves, as Shaun Gallagher puts it, “a convergence on a methodological plane” 
that centers on, “how phenomenology is put to use in the research fields of 
psychology and neuroscience” (Gallagher 2012, p.75). 
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An interest in Merleau-Ponty has been particularly prominent among a group 
of theorists referred to as “post-cognitivists”. The term “post-cognitivism” refers to a 
group of approaches in the cognitive sciences that argue for a vindication of the role 
of embodiment in the understanding of cognition. As Paco Calvo and Toni Gomila 
(2008, p.7) put it: 
At a minimum, all these approaches conceive of cognition and 
behaviour in terms of the dynamical interaction (coupling) of an 
embodied system that is embedded into the surrounding environment. 
The key themes are “embodiment” and environmental “embeddedness”. 
In cognitive science, and in much philosophy of mind, Merleau-Ponty is read 
as offering a theory of perception consisting of a set of phenomenological 
descriptions. From this set of phenomenological descriptions, a set of arguments is 
derived that are said to be convergent with work in the empirical cognitive sciences 
and in contemporary philosophy of mind – for example, regarding the intimate 
interdependence of perception and action, the non-conceptual content of perceptual 
experience and the irreducibility of bodily perception.1 
The recent increase of interest in the role of the phenomenology of embodied 
perception by post-cognitivists, and their enthusiastic use of Merleau-Ponty’s work, 
raises a question concerning the philosophical import these readings take Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology to have. This question can be fruitfully explored by asking: 
what would the Merleau-Ponty of Phenomenology of Perception have thought of this 
                                                
1 On non-conceptual content see: (Evans 1982); (Kelly 2001); (Peacocke 1989). On ‘enactive’ perception see (Noë 2004). And 
on the irreducibility of perception see (Carman 2005). 
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use of his phenomenology in the cognitive sciences? This question raises the issue 
of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the relationship between the sciences and 
philosophy, and of what he took the philosophical significance of his phenomenology 
to be. He was certainly always very interested in empirical scientific material and his 
breadth of understanding, particularly in the field of psychology, is clear from the 
range of discussion in his published work. Given this, there is little doubt that he 
would be enthusiastic about the project of the cognitive sciences as a tool to deepen 
our understanding of the details and complexities of consciousness. Nevertheless, it 
is my view that Merleau-Ponty would be concerned that this scientific interest in his 
work might serve to occlude the deeper philosophical significance that he sought to 
express. In order to indicate why, it will be instructive to look at certain claims made 
in the context of recent post-cognitivist proposals. The purpose of my analysis is not 
to provide a general critique of the authors I discuss – a task too complex to be 
achievable within present constraints – but rather to focus on certain specific claims 
that I think Merleau-Ponty would argue involve implicit “objectivist” assumptions. 
These assumptions have epistemological and ontological implications of the type 
that the Phenomenology argues we ought to ultimately reject.  
The claims that I explore in Part One concern 1) the concept of the 
“intentional arc” in relation to a “connectionist” proposal by Hubert Dreyfus; 2) the 
concept of the “body schema” in relation to the “enactivist” approach taken by Sean 
Gallagher in his book How the Body Shapes the Mind; and 3) the concept of the 
“lived body” – “the body as we live it” – in relation to the characterization of 
embodiment in the groundbreaking “enactivist” work of Varela, Thompson and 
Rosch’s The Embodied Mind. I argue that these uses of Merleau-Ponty tacitly “de-
transcendentalize” his phenomenology in order to read it as a phenomenological 
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psychology that is consonant with the project of the cognitive sciences. I further 
argue that Merleau-Ponty would view this as potentially occluding the philosophical 
implications of his phenomenology because the attempt to theorize our 
consciousness scientifically, incorporating insights from his phenomenological 
account of the lived body, might be taken to make the transcendental dimension of 
his philosophy redundant. This is a problem because, although we do not address 
the transcendental dimension when engaged in a scientific approach to 
consciousness, his philosophical view is that when raising philosophical questions, 
as we inevitably must, we cannot quarantine an empirical exploration of the question 
of consciousness from a transcendental exploration. This is because the in principle 
limitations of a scientific approach necessitate a philosophical phenomenological 
account that is not entitled to presuppose the conceptual framework supplied to the 
science of psychology via other sciences, and ultimately resting on the “natural 
attitude”. In other words it requires a transcendental theorizing of consciousness built 
from a solid phenomenological base – a transcendental-phenomenological theory.2 
In Part Two of the article I argue that given the methodological constraints 
imposed by Merleau-Ponty’s consistent application of the phenomenological 
“principle of evidence” – the stipulation that all theoretical constructions be grounded 
by phenomenological evidence – he holds that the only viable concept of the 
empirical-transcendental relation is one that is phenomenologically defensible. This 
is a different view to the conception of the relation that Husserl advocates and that 
Gallagher, for example, attributes to Merleau-Ponty in reading him as a 
                                                
2 Although Merleau-Ponty is a type of transcendental phenomenologist, his ‘existential’ position is substantially different from 
Husserl’s position that famously bears the name ‘Transcendental Phenomenology’. 
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phenomenological psychologist.3 The upshot of this is that, although it is certainly 
legitimate to read Merleau-Ponty as phenomenological psychologist with a great deal 
to contribute to the project of cognitive science and, despite the fact that he would 
have been an enthusiastic supporter of the project, he would nevertheless view 
these readings as potentially encouraging the misreading of the philosophical 
content of the Phenomenology. 
 
1. De-transcendentalizing Merleau-Ponty for Cognitive Science 
1.1. Hubert Dreyfus’s Connectionist Proposal and the Intentional Arc 
Although Dreyfus’s suggestions in this direction are tentative, and he is well known 
for his role as the “Heideggerian gadfly of the cognitive science enterprise” (Varela, 
Thompson & Rosch 1991, p.xvi), he nevertheless affirms a potential continuity 
between Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and cognitive science that rests on a “de-
transcendentalizing” of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. Holding that “cognitive scientists 
have much to learn from Merleau-Ponty” (Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1999, p.103), Dreyfus 
incorporates Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology in his critique of representationalism 
in cognitive science. Dreyfus strongly critiques the view that “intelligence consists in 
the acquisition and manipulation of internal symbols that stand for [or ‘represent’] 
salient features of the environment” (Tauber 2008, p.23).  
                                                
3 Gallagher’s exploratory thinking addresses different audiences in such a way that it is not clear whether a particular 
presentation could be said to represent a “general position”. Compare, for example, his discussion of hermeneutics in his 
contributions to Merleau-Ponty, Hermeneutics, and Postmodernism (1992), his discussion of “neo-Aristotelian neurobiology” in 
chapter 6 of How the Body Shapes the Mind (2006) and the arguments concerning phenomenology, transcendentalism and 
cognitive science presented in The Phenomenological Mind (2007) and “On the Possibility of Naturalizing Phenomenology” 
(2012). It is these latter arguments that I take myself to be addressing in this article.  
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In explaining the flaws in this view, and in his proposal of an alternative, 
Dreyfus suggests that we might equate Merleau-Ponty’s notion of an “intentional arc” 
with the notion of a “feedback loop” in cognitive science. In Phenomenology of 
Perception Merleau-Ponty claims that: 
… the life of consciousness—cognitive life, the life of desire or 
perceptual life—is subtended by an ‘intentional arc’ which projects 
round about us our past, our future, our human setting, our physical, 
ideological and moral situation, or rather which results in our being 
situated in all these respects (Merleau-Ponty 2002, p.157). 
Dreyfus takes this concept to represent a certain kind of dialectical relationship 
between the active subject and its milieu. He explains that: 
… the notion of a dialectic of milieu and action is meant to capture the 
idea that, in learning, past experience is projected back into the 
perceptual world of the learner and shows up as affordances or 
solicitations to further action. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, a ‘person’s 
projects polarize the world, bringing magically to view a host of signs 
which guide action …’ (Dreyfus 2005, p.132; Merleau-Ponty quote from 
Merleau-Ponty 2002, p.129) 
Dreyfus articulates the intentional arc in the process of skill acquisition as a 
“feedback loop between the learner and the perceptual world” (Dreyfus 2005, p.132). 
Understanding Merleau-Ponty's notion of the “intentional arc” in this way then allows 
him to argue for a convergence between it and the non-representationalist theory of 
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neural networks. This theory, also known as “connectionism”, utilizes simulated 
systems of neurons called “neural networks”. The artificial neurons or “nodes” are 
programming constructs that mimic the properties of biological neurons. Whereas 
“GOFAI” (good old-fashioned AI) employs the sequential processing of information 
according to specified rules, neural net or “connectionist” approaches take the brain 
as their model. This attempt to simulate the brain means that the processing of 
information within a neural network is distributed throughout the entire network. As 
such, neural networks are said to be capable of “learning”. And they do so in such a 
way that in dealing with a new “situation” they do not have to rely on a stored 
memory or a rule in order to cope. Thus, it is suggested that they simulate what 
Merleau-Ponty describes as our basic non-representational bodily coping in 
everyday human performance. The logic of the argument is that neural-network 
theory and Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of our basic bodily coping with the world 
can be claimed to stand in a relationship of mutual support in demonstrating the 
implausibility of representationalism. 
Dreyfus argues that “the representationalist accounts of our most basic and 
pervasive forms of learning and skillful action are mistaken” and “require a different 
account”. This claim, he says, can be defended “not only on phenomenological 
grounds, but on neuroscientific grounds as well” (Dreyfus 2005, p.142). Merleau-
Ponty (2002, p.159) holds the view that “consciousness is in the first place not a 
matter of ‘I think that’ but of ‘I can’”, an intentional bodily relation to the world 
whereby the world is revealed to us by and through our bodily capacity to interact 
with it. In the context of an argument for the importance of Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology to cognitive science, Dreyfus (Dreyfus & Dreyfus 1999) suggests 
that “Merleau-Ponty's account of the ‘I can’” might be “supplemented” (p.118) with an 
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account of how the body – conceived objectivistically as an “actual body-structure” 
(p.117)  – shapes our cognitive capacities. 
The general rationale behind Dreyfus’s move here is rooted in the way that a 
cognitive sciences approach views the intrinsic limitations of a purely 
phenomenological approach. Dreyfus suggests this in his discussion of how 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological approach may be said to leave him without a 
convincing account through which to understand the reciprocal process 
characteristic of skilled behaviour: how “past experience is projected back into the 
perceptual world of the learner and shows up as affordances or solicitations to 
further action” (Dreyfus 2005, p.132). This is what Merleau-Ponty calls the dialectical 
process of progressive development and refinement of perceptual and motor 
capacities, and his phenomenology identifies it as a central feature of embodied 
perception. However, suggests Dreyfus, from the phenomenological perspective 
Merleau-Ponty is left to marvel at the “magical” nature of the perception-action 
feedback loop. Dreyfus is referring here to Merleau-Ponty’s claim that “for the normal 
person his projects polarize the world, bringing magically to view a host of signs 
which guide action …”(Merleau-Ponty 2002, p.129 italics added) The suggestion is 
that the way acquired skills are projected back into our phenomenal field4 in terms of 
capacities for action or affordances can only be described by Merleau-Ponty as the 
phenomenal field being reconstituted, “being reorganized” by a “… law unknown to 
the subject” (Merleau-Ponty 2002, p.225). Thus, Merleau-Ponty uses the term 
“magic” to evoke the idea that this process is in no sense reliant on any act of the 
subject; rather, it is a structure of perceptual experience that simply passively occurs 
                                                
4 The phenomenal field is Merleau-Ponty’s term for the meaningful field of experience that is constituted and reconstituted for 
us in a progressive and ongoing way as a result of our bodily interactions with the world. 
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and, as such, is phenomenologically available for description as simply “magically” 
occurring. 
The important point for my present purpose is that in this proposal Dreyfus 
implies that a neurobiological account might be the appropriate place to supplement 
Merleau-Ponty’s incomplete phenomenological account, rather than just further 
phenomenological and conceptual exploration of the issue. However, Dreyfus’s 
proposal rests on an implicit modification of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. This is 
evidenced in the move of translating the concept “intentional arc” into the concept 
“feedback loop”, a move carried out on the grounds of a deeper translation that takes 
place without sufficient argumentation; yet it is the philosophical ground that makes 
the former translation possible. This deeper translation consists of “de-
transcendentalizing” Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical position in order to read it as a 
phenomenological psychology. 
Phenomenological psychology understands phenomenological studies as 
forming a part of the science of psychology. This is an empirical science about “the 
nature of the psyche … a science about psychical life understood as a real occurrent 
entity in the natural world” (Zahavi 2004, p.336). On Merleau-Ponty’s view 
phenomenological psychology, like any science, is philosophically “naïve” because it 
simply takes its subject matter “nature” for granted. In theorizing consciousness it 
thinks out of a background conceptual framework the fundamental categories of 
which are provided by the natural sciences. And the natural sciences are the 
methods of experimentally-oriented theorizing that address an objective world that it 
purports to discover out there wholly independent of human enquirers. This is as it 
should be because this presupposition is a core part of what constitutes something 
as a science. 
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This presupposing of the conceptual framework involves what Merleau-Ponty 
calls “objective thought” or “objectivism”. The claim is that cognitive science attempts 
to understand consciousness on an implicit ontological model. On this model the 
world is comprised of mutually exterior parts. Merleau-Ponty, in reference to 
Descartes, often uses the Latin phrase partes extra partes as shorthand for the idea 
that the parts that comprise the wholes that we experience are understood as having 
an external independent existence – without interdependence. They are thus 
subject-independent and atomistic. The other part of this implicit model is what he 
calls “the prejudice of determinate being” (Merleau-Ponty 2002, p.59). To hold the 
prejudice of determinate being is to unjustifiably presuppose the existence of a 
determinate world – a world consisting of a totality of determinate three-dimensional 
spatio-temporal objects with determinate properties and their relations. On this view, 
to use Joseph Margolis’s phrase, the world is both “determinate and knowable as 
such” (Margolis 2010, p.26). The scientific “naturalistic” approach is taken to be a 
formalization at the theoretical level of our “natural attitude” – our basic “natural” view 
that there exists a subject-independent world that is a totality of objects. 
Merleau-Ponty’s project in Phenomenology of Perception, on the other hand, 
is a project of philosophical phenomenology. This project is one that does not 
presuppose objectivism in the service of a scientific understanding of consciousness, 
but instead asks fundamental questions about how experience and scientific 
theorizing are possible, on the grounds that “objective thought” is unable to 
adequately conceptualize meaningful lived experience within its categorial frame, 
and therefore the presupposition of objectivism cannot be philosophically warranted. 
 12 
And so Merleau-Ponty advocates a transcendental philosophical position 
whose central methodological feature is the phenomenological reduction.5 What he 
explicitly seeks to do is to use this methodology to show why analyses in terms of 
concepts like feedback loops understood “objectivistically” are ultimately inadequate 
to capture the full holistic richness of what he characterizes as the “intentional arc” 
structure of our lived experience. Merleau-Ponty explicitly states that he is in the 
business of formulating a phenomenological ontology (an “existential 
phenomenology”), where his key technical terms the “body-subject”6 and “being-in-
the-world”7 are understood to express structures of being – they are 
phenomenological-ontological categories, not just phenomenological ones. 
The phenomenological reduction is precisely what secures a transcendental 
perspective for Merleau-Ponty. The transcendental perspective is a philosophical 
perspective that asks questions about what makes the phenomenal field possible, 
i.e. it asks the transcendental question: what are its conditions of possibility? But the 
phenomenal field – the field of experience - is only properly accessed via the 
                                                
5 The phenomenological reduction consists of a methodological demand for a ‘change of attitude’. This change of attitude is 
intended to take us from the perspective of viewing the world as we normally do – as a mind-independent ‘real world’ – to 
viewing this self-same world in terms of how it comes to be meaningfully constituted in our experience. 
6 Merleau-Ponty holds that a central expression of our fundamental ontological ambiguity can be seen in our experience of the 
‘lived body’. The body is lived by me as being ambiguous between the notion of a pure ‘subject’ (a pure consciousness) and a 
pure ‘object’ (in the sense of an extended substance). His category ‘body-subject’ is intended to name this unique type of being.  
7 Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy sees the relations between humans and the world as consisting in a complex and inextricable 
‘intertwining’ between body and world. He rejects the (Cartesian) assumption that the world and the subject are ontologically 
separable. What phenomenological investigation reveals is that all of our experience is fundamentally world-oriented, through 
our pre-reflective intentional relation. There can be no objects of experience except through our taking up of those objects as 
figures standing out against a background, or world, which is essential for them being the objects that they are. The world for us 
is ‘always already there’; we are consciousness-for-a-world. Likewise there can be no conception of ‘world’ but through the 
body-subject’s capacities for having a world. A world is that which is structured in relation to the bodily explorations of a motor-
intentional subject. His category ‘being-in-the-world’ is intended to name this primordial existential unity. 
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phenomenological reduction, the suspension of the natural attitude that underpins 
the perspective of scientific psychology, or any scientific approach. On his account, 
an existential ontology centering on the concept of the “body-subject” as “being-in-
the world” provides the conditions of possibility for the phenomenal field. And the 
“phenomenal field”, being accessed through phenomenological reduction, is shown 
to provide the conditions of possibility for our “empirical perception” (Merleau-Ponty 
2002, p.50) that takes the natural attitude for granted. 
Merleau-Ponty holds this view because he is the most consistently 
phenomenological of philosophers, which means as a philosopher he will only 
countenance epistemological and ontological theoretical claims that are sufficiently 
phenomenologically grounded. And in his view a concept like “feedback loop” relies 
on a concept of causality that is without sufficient phenomenological warrant to be a 
fundamental ontological category. Whereas “intentional arc” is a descriptive concept 
that better captures the richness of the lived intentional body-world relation. 
In Dreyfus’s proposal Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology is no longer a 
transcendental phenomenology; it has been tacitly reconstructed as a 
phenomenological psychology in order for the argument to work. This implicit 
reconstruction understands Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological claims as claims 
about the structure and content of embodied perceptual experience within the natural 
attitude and, thus, of the same order as claims made in the natural science of 
psychology. And given that they are reconstructed as claims about the cognitive 
experience of “the mind” or “psyche”, in the sense that this term is traditionally used 
in “philosophy of mind”, it follows, as Dreyfus suggests, that these claims can be 
deployed in the service of either the confirmation or disconfirmation of theories in the 
cognitive sciences. 
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Perhaps Dreyfus’s proposal is intended to be read as an argument that a 
cognitive scientific perspective, if it is to progress beyond its present point, needs to 
learn from Merleau-Ponty’s account of embodiment in order to avoid incoherence on 
its own terms. Basically, the idea would be that any and all representationalist 
approaches to perception necessarily fail and that connectionism at least avoids this 
non-start. And, given the centrality of skill acquisition to a theory of consciousness, it 
might fruitfully explore this area using Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological 
descriptions as a plausibility test for its theoretical models. This, of course, makes it 
an argument firmly within the epistemic framework of cognitive science. 
Nevertheless, Dreyfus’s proposal potentially occludes the philosophical 
significance that Merleau-Ponty would ultimately wish to emphasise. The key move 
here is his translation of the concept of the “intentional arc” in terms of that of a 
“feedback loop”. He justifies this by referring to a statement in Merleau-Ponty’s 
earlier work, The Structure of Behaviour, where Merleau-Ponty asserts the 
“dialectical” nature of the relationship between organism and environment in the 
following way: “the relations between the organism and its milieu are not relations of 
linear causality but of circular causality” (Merleau-Ponty 1963, p.15). 
As Justin Tauber correctly argues in connection with this: 
The translation from ‘circular causality’ to ‘feedback loop’ is certainly a 
lot less problematic than it would be from ‘intentional arc’ … However, 
it isn't clear that Merleau-Ponty would himself endorse the equation of 
the meaning of ‘intentional arc’ and ‘circular causality’ given that, prior 
to introducing the former phrase in the Phenomenology, he writes that 
‘reciprocal action’ is as yet only a compromise with causal thought, and 
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a contradictory principle’ (Tauber 2008, p.24; Merleau-Ponty quote 
from Merleau-Ponty 2002, p.127).  
So there is an important modification being undertaken with respect to the role 
of causal explanation in Dreyfus’s proposal. But this is a modification that potentially 
encourages us to lose sight of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical intention, which is to 
argue that such causal explanation is ultimately philosophically inadequate to deal 
with consciousness. This, he argues, is because it fails to see how such explanation 
derives its meaning from the more basic level of meaning in lived experience, which 
eludes the best efforts of derivative explanatory “causal thought”. 
 
1.2. Shaun Gallagher and the Body Schema: Remapping the Terrain between 
Phenomenology and Neuroscience 
The second example is Shaun Gallagher’s (2006) recent use of Merleau-Ponty in his 
skillful attempt to negotiate the space between “the subpersonal level of cognitive 
mechanisms” and “the realm of phenomenology” (p.3). This project argues for the 
centrality of embodiment in the “development and proper functioning of various 
aspects of cognition” (p.4). Gallagher comes from the strand of post-cognitivism that 
argues for an “enactive” approach to cognition. Like Dreyfus these authors argue 
against representationalism and for the view of perception as a process essentially 
bound up with action. Alva Noë (2004, p.1) captures the main thrust of this 
“enactivist” view of perception in the following passage: 
Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us. It is 
something we do. Think of a blind person tap-tapping his or her way 
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around a cluttered space, perceiving that space by touch, not all at 
once, but through time, by skillful probing and movement. This is, or at 
least ought to be, our paradigm of what perceiving is. The world makes 
itself available to the perceiver through physical movement and 
interaction … [A]ll perception is touchlike in this way: Perceptual 
experience acquires content thanks to our possession of bodily skills. 
What we perceive is determined by what we do (or what we know how 
to do); it is determined by what we are ready to do … we enact our 
perceptual experience; we act it out. 
Gallagher’s (2006. p.5) strategy is to “remap the terrain” between 
phenomenology and cognitive neuroscience through a vocabulary “developed 
around the conceptual distinction between body image and body schema”8 and an 
account of the role of “prenoetic functions”.9 This framework, he suggests, is one that 
can integrate “first-­‐person phenomenology” and the “third-­‐person science of 
embodied cognition” (p.6). This is because it “remains true to a phenomenological 
description of experience” while simultaneously remaining “open to empirical 
scientific explanation, especially from the perspectives of developmental psychology 
and cognitive neuroscience” (p.13). 
In this project Gallagher (1998) reads Merleau-Ponty as addressing the issue 
of “bodily systems that operate on a subpersonal, automatic level” (p.223). Like 
                                                
8 ‘A body image consists of a system of perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs pertaining to one's own body. In contrast, a body 
schema is a system of sensory-­‐motor capacities that function without awareness or the necessity of perceptual monitoring’ 
(p.24). 
9 ‘… those embodied processes and performances that cannot be reduced to neurophysiology, but that necessarily happen 
before one knows anything in a cognitive manner’ (p.12). 
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Dreyfus, Gallagher suggests that Merleau-Ponty’s extension of the concept of 
intentionality to include the motor intentionality of the bodily subject must inevitably 
run up against the limitations of the phenomenological method. Arguing that the role 
of the body schema is “impenetrable to phenomenological reflection”, he concludes 
that it ought to be “worked out conceptually with the help of the empirical sciences” 
(p.223). However, Gallagher’s use of the term “body schema” stands in the same 
type of relation to Merleau-Ponty’s usage that Dreyfus’s use of “feedback loop” 
stands to Merleau-Ponty’s “intentional arc”. 
For example, Gallagher says that: 
In the plural, body schemas (or schemata) refer to a collection of motor 
programs or motor habits that individually may be defined by a specific 
movement or posture, for example, the movement of hand to mouth. 
The motor schema, in this example, is more complex than it first might 
seem. Not only are the anatomical parts of hand and face involved, but 
also a large number of muscle systems throughout the body are 
activated for purposes of maintaining balance. One might refer to this 
entire complex organization of movement as ‘a body schema’, and 
consider that a subject is capable of many such complex patterns. 
When…I use the phrase ‘body schema’, it may refer to a particular 
schema or, more generally, to the larger system or collection of 
schemas (Gallagher 2006, p.24). 
There are two inter-related issues that I think Merleau-Ponty would have with 
being associated with this characterization. The first one is that the discussion of the 
body schema in terms of a “collection of motor programs or motor habits” evidences 
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a slip between ‘motor habits’ – a concept that he would be comfortable with – and 
“motor programs” – a concept that he would view as resting on an implicit 
objectivism. Secondly, and connected with this, is Gallagher’s use of the term to 
name a “collection” of “schemas” or “motor programs”. I think that Merleau-Ponty 
would view this as an atomistic and pluralizing use of the term, the implication of 
which is that the general body schema that he discusses is ultimately a complex 
systemic aggregate of various motor programs, like the movement of hand to mouth. 
This objectivistic way of conceiving of it, I think he would want to say, eclipses the 
philosophical significance of the holism and generality displayed in the functioning of 
the lived body. In drawing out this philosophical significance Merleau-Ponty (2002) 
argues that “my body is that meaningful core which behaves like a general function” 
(p.170). He also argues that “the body is our general medium for having a world” 
(p.169). As such, the body schema is best “understood in terms of the general 
movement of being-in-the-world” (p.115).  
On Merleau-Ponty’s transcendental-phenomenological account, the body 
functions as “the subject of perception” by means of the “body schema”. But the 
“body schema” for Merleau-Ponty is that which provides an a priori structure to 
human experience of the world. It manifests as a set of basic bodily capacities that 
are geared into an experiential world which calls on those capacities in a kind of 
“dialogue” between body and world. The three main aspects of the body schema are:  
1) The figure/ground structure in object perception (“The perceptual 
‘something’ is always in the middle of something else, it always forms part of a 
‘field’” (p.4). 
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2) Our intrinsically perspectival orientation in space and time (being embodied 
means that we are necessarily spatio-temporally situated and therefore 
everything we think or do is “perspectival”). 
3) The horizonal structure of the phenomenal field in general (for example, as 
part of the meaning of “perceiving an object” each object has a “horizon” of 
other possible perceptions we might have of the object. It also has an “outer 
horizon” which is the implicitly perceived context in which it is necessarily 
situated). 
In Merleau-Ponty’s hands the concept is intended to articulate necessity conditions 
for being a human embodied perceiver. And despite being phenomenologically 
grounded, they are not empirical claims in the sense of empirical generalizations. 
The necessity conditions he articulates in his account of the body schema are 
contingent a priori conditions. A priori because even though they are 
phenomenologically constrained, the claims are not empirical generalizations; they 
are necessity claims regarding the constitutive structure for being a human 
embodied perceiver. Yet they are contingent because, unlike Kant, Merleau-Ponty is 
not talking about all possible perceivers – human or non-human – but only us, and 
our bodies might have been other than they are in fact are. This is a transcendental 
philosophical use of the concept “body schema” that Merleau-Ponty would wish to 
distinguish from Gallagher’s phenomenological psychological version. And, as with 
Dreyfus’s proposal regarding the intentional arc, he would be understandably 
concerned that the de-transcendentalized version might serve to encourage a way of 
reading the Phenomenology that loses sight of his philosophical intentions.  
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1.3. Varela, Thompson and Rosch: The “Double Sense” Conception of the 
Body and the “Lived Body” 
My final example comes the work of Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor 
Rosch (1991). Despite the many valuable things that this groundbreaking work 
contributed to the field of cognitive science, on the strict issue of their interpretation 
of Merleau-Ponty there is a significant problem with their characterization of his 
conception of embodiment. In their proposal for an “enactivist” approach to cognitive 
science they attribute a “double sense” conception of embodiment to Merleau-Ponty. 
They assert that “for Merleau-Ponty, as for us, embodiment has this double sense: it 
encompasses both the body as a lived, experiential structure and the body as the 
context … of cognitive mechanisms” (p.xvi).10 I think that this claim would cause 
Merleau-Ponty considerable concern. This is because this characterization fails to 
capture his conception of the lived body as the “third term between the psychic and 
the physiological” (Merleau-Ponty 2002, p.140n).11 As a “lived body” we are neither 
pure subject nor pure object but rather experience a richly meaningful intentional 
“world”, resting on our basic bodily intentionality. His nuanced phenomenologically 
grounded attempt to understand the uniqueness of the lived body as a “between the 
two” (entre-deux) has been linked to a conception that more easily fits within the 
framework of the scientific project for which it has been invoked. In this 
characterization of embodiment, a view has been attributed to Merleau-Ponty that, 
again, implies his conception is that of a phenomenological psychology. 
                                                
10 cf: their talk of the ‘sensorimotor structure of the perceiver (the way in which the nervous system links sensory and motor 
surfaces)’ (p.173). 
11 Hubert Dreyfus initially pointed this out in his review of their book, emphasizing Merleau-Ponty’s claim that the ‘body-subject’ 
instantiates a ‘genus of being’ (Dreyfus 1993). 
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In the Phenomenology Merleau-Ponty (2002) criticizes the neuroscientists 
and psychologists of his day for not seeing the full philosophical significance of the 
phenomenology of the lived body. For example, he takes Adhemar Gelb and Kurt 
Goldstein to task for the way that their presupposition of objectivism clouds their 
grasp of the phenomena. Merleau-Ponty argues that in their discussion of Schneider 
and other case studies: 
Gelb and Goldstein … have never named this third term between the 
psychic and the physiological, between the ‘for itself’ and the ‘in itself’ 
to which their analyses always led them and which we call existence. 
Hence their earliest works often fall back on the traditional dichotomy of 
body and consciousness (p.140n). 
It is this subject/object dichotomy that appears to be replicated in the “double sense” 
view suggested by Varela, Thompson and Rosch: “the body as a lived, experiential 
structure” and “the body as the context … of cognitive mechanisms”. Likewise, this 
doggedly persistent dualism haunts Dreyfus’s connectionist proposal and 
Gallagher’s “remapping of the terrain” between phenomenology and neuroscience. 
Merleau-Ponty would argue that an awareness of a crucial role for the 
description of experience in the understanding of consciousness does not entail that 
one has grasped the philosophical significance of what he intended to designate by 
the term the “lived body”. For example, despite his regular praise for the important 
research of the Gestalt theorists – “the psychologists who practise the description of 
phenomena” – Merleau-Ponty nevertheless argues that they are “not … aware of the 
philosophical implications of their method” (p.54). As a result of this philosophical 
“naiveté”, they ultimately try to explain “the … objects in the [phenomenal] field” in 
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terms of “causes of … perception” (p.55). This is because they are constrained by 
“the ideal” of an “explanatory psychology” that “betrays its own descriptions” by 
taking “as given the determinate universe of science” – placing “perceptual 
consciousness in the midst of a ready-made world” (p.55). In not questioning the 
“objective thinking of classical logic and philosophy” and “the alleged self-evidence of 
realism”, the Gestalt theorists fail to understand the need for a “phenomenological 
reduction” (p.57).  
Gestalt theorists aside, Varela, Thompson and Rosch’s suggestion touches 
the core of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. This is because his whole position grows out 
of the notion of the lived body. In this case, I think he would be swift to point out that 
his account of the lived body has been “de-transcendentalized” because it is being 
viewed within the perspective of the natural attitude as the “psyche” aspect of a 
psycho-physical being. He would also want to point out that viewing it this way is 
certainly legitimate, but that this elision of the difference between his and their views 
indicates that Varela, Thompson and Rosch struggle to understand the properly 
philosophical significance of embodiment that Gelb, Goldstein and the Gestaltists 
also struggled to see, and that Merleau-Ponty argued for in the Phenomenology. 
 
2. Quarantining Merleau-Ponty as Phenomenological Psychologist from 
Merleau-Ponty as Transcendental Philosopher 
 
The preceding discussion might meet the response that, regardless of what he is up 
to in the area of transcendental philosophy, it is legitimate to read Merleau-Ponty as 
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a philosopher engaged in “what could be generally called phenomenological 
psychology” (Gallagher 2012 p.74) as a result of his “integration of phenomenology, 
psychology, and neurology” (Gallagher 2012 p.75). This “integration” is played out 
via his detailed concrete engagement with the psychological and neurological 
literature in The Structure of Behaviour, Phenomenology of Perception and his 
lecture course material on psychology (Merleau-Ponty 2010). And provided that we 
clearly acknowledge that there is a transcendental dimension to Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy proper in discussions of concepts that draw on his work, such as the 
“intentional arc” or “lived body”, then it is hard to see how he could take issue with 
this. However, Sean Gallagher’s recent discussion of this issue provides an 
interesting example of why things are not quite so clear-cut. 
Now it might be argued that by giving an account of the transcendental 
dimension of phenomenological philosophy, and by acknowledging Merleau-Ponty’s 
transcendentalism, Gallagher has, without exploring it in detail, nevertheless 
demonstrated a clear grasp of the philosophical dimension of Merleau-Ponty’s 
thought. For Gallagher explicitly claims that a cognitive science approach does not 
straightforwardly serve to occlude or replace the transcendental phenomenological 
project. Rather, it simply does not to address it because it is outside the scope of a 
scientific approach to consciousness. Let us briefly look at Gallagher’s account and 
how I think Merleau-Ponty would view it. 
Gallagher (2007) says that “phenomenology is a philosophical enterprise; it is 
not an empirical discipline” (p.29). Despite this, phenomenological analyses clearly 
have “ramifications for and pertinence to an empirical study of consciousness and 
cognitive sciences” (p.29). Pointing out that “we can put the insights gained in 
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transcendental phenomenology to use in science” (p.29) he quotes Husserl, who 
argued that:  
every analysis or theory of transcendental phenomenology – including . 
. . the theory of the transcendental constitution of an objective world – 
can be developed in the natural realm, by giving up the transcendental 
attitude (Husserl 1950, p.159).  
In taking up the transcendental attitude we “move through methodological steps into 
the phenomenological stance”, but we can also “take the insights developed in that 
stance and carry them back into science” (Gallagher & Zahavi 2007, p.29). 
Pointing out that his phenomenology is not “‘pure’ in the Husserlian sense”, 
Gallagher (2006) claims that his conception “follow[s] the path of Merleau-­‐Ponty”, 
being “informed by extensive readings in psychology and neuroscience” (p.10). The 
Merleau-Ponty involved here is one where The Structure of Behaviour and 
Phenomenology of Perception are seen as consisting of basically the same “kinds of 
investigations” (Gallagher 2008, p.207). This view is taken to be illustrated by the 
fact that: 
… although [Merleau-Ponty] did not engage in scientific experiments, 
he took contemporary empirical studies seriously and used science in 
an interdisciplinary fashion, to motivate his phenomenological 
investigations (Gallagher 2008, p.208). 
Given this importance of empirical studies in motivating his phenomenology 
Gallagher argues that: 
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If we understand cognitive science in the very general sense of an 
interdisciplinary scientific enterprise that attempts to explain cognition, 
where cognition is defined to include not simply higher-order thought, 
but such things as perception and emotion, then Merleau-Ponty was 
certainly involved in that kind of enterprise (Gallagher 2008, p.207). 
Now it is certainly true to say that Merleau-Ponty “used science in an interdisciplinary 
fashion, to motivate his phenomenological investigations”. It is thus true that he was 
involved in a sort of inter-disciplinary cognitive scientific enterprise before the fact.12 
But I think Merleau-Ponty would view Gallagher’s characterization of his involvement 
with the sciences as obscuring the transcendental dimension of his philosophy that 
Gallagher pointed to in The Phenomenological Mind. As such, Merleau-Ponty’s use 
of empirical research in the service of providing detailed concrete content with which 
to substantiate philosophical arguments intended to address epistemological and 
ontological questions might then recede from view. For Merleau-Ponty’s purpose in 
using empirical research is always to draw the reader’s attention to phenomena that 
can, and ought to be, re-described from the philosophical-phenomenological point of 
view. This is because it is only from this perspective, he argues, that its true 
philosophical significance can be grasped. 
This point can be made clear if we look at the case study that Merleau-Ponty 
discusses at greatest length in Phenomenology of Perception – that of the aphasic 
“Schneider” who suffered from a brain injury as the result of being struck by a shell 
splinter during the First World War. The Schneider case is complex but a basic 
sketch of Merleau-Ponty’s (2012) analysis will suffice for my present point. Schneider 
                                                
12 He also held the Chair of Child Psychology and Pedagogy at the Sorbonne from 1949 to1952. 
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can comfortably perform complex habitual concrete movements, such as those 
involved in making and mending clothes, but is unable to perform any “abstract” 
movements, like pointing his arm in a specified direction or locating unseen points of 
contact on his body (p.118). Schneider is also unable, for example, to engage in 
play-acting (p.156).  
Despite the fact that he has retained his capacity for perception and habitual 
movement, he has lost of a sense of the range of possible movements that are 
normally available to us. Merleau-Ponty argues that this indicates that although he 
has retained a sense of his “phenomenal body”, his loss of the ability for “abstract” 
movement and play-acting indicates that he has lost the sense of his body as 
something objectively located in space and, as such, available for “gratuitous and 
free spatial thought” (p.119). The inability to orient himself in relation to the possible 
means that Schneider lacks the ability to “creatively reorganize the structure of [his] 
world and then retain this reorganized structure as a cultural ‘sediment’ within [his] 
experience of the world” (Baldwin 2004, p.16). But the purpose of going through the 
empirical material for Merleau-Ponty is to draw the reader’s attention to a crucial 
philosophical point. Merleau-Ponty’s goal in discussing the detail of the impoverished 
world that Schneider experiences as a result of his disorder is to bring into relief, by 
contrast, our normal motor-intentional capacities. Again, Merleau-Ponty’s (2002) 
discussion is complex, but a key point of showing us the “levelling-down of the world” 
(p.150) that Schneider experiences is to illustrate the way that: 
It is this existential basis of intelligence which is affected, much more 
than intelligence itself, for, as we have shown, Schneider’s general 
intelligence is intact … Beneath the intelligence as an anonymous 
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function or a categorial process, a personal core has to be recognized, 
which is the patient’s being, his power of existing (p.155). 
And Merleau-Ponty explicates “this existential basis of intelligence” in the very words 
that Dreyfus quotes in discussing of his connectionist proposal: 
… the life of consciousness – cognitive life, the life of desire or 
perceptual life – is subtended by an ‘intentional arc’ which projects 
round about us our past, our future, our human setting, our physical, 
ideological and moral situation, or rather which results from our being 
situated in all these respects. It is this intentional arc which brings 
about the unity of the senses, of intelligence, of sensibility and motility. 
And it is this which ‘goes limp’ in [Schneider’s] illness (p.157). 
So Merleau-Ponty uses the Schneider case material with the express purpose of 
explicating his concept of motor-intentionality, our basic bodily intentionality, and 
thus to lay out an important foundation of his theory. But he does not simply stop at 
the phenomenological concept of motor-intentionality. Having laid this out, he goes 
on to explicate the ontological dimension of this motor-intentionality as the existential 
structure “being-in-the-world”. His philosophical point is that empirical scientific 
accounts cannot adequately characterize this structure because their “objectivist” 
conceptual commitments cause them to miss the true epistemological and 
ontological implications of the phenomenological concept of motor-intentionality.  
So even though Merleau-Ponty was involved in a kind of cognitive scientific 
enterprise before the fact, I think he would want to say that, however scientifically 
productive it may be, it encourages a misunderstanding of the Phenomenology to 
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read it as a work of phenomenological psychology. This is because Merleau-Ponty 
does not simply presuppose the natural attitude, unlike the cognitive sciences which 
necessarily presuppose it. As such he takes up a “critical attitude” with respect to the 
sciences and aims to provide a “radical reflection” (p.157) on their very possibility. 
Now Gallagher might respond here that he is not advocating that it only be 
read as a work of phenomenological psychology, just that it is perfectly legitimate to 
do so in the interest of embodied cognitive science. However, there is a further issue 
that Merleau-Ponty would raise at this point. This is that Gallagher misunderstands 
Merleau-Ponty as a phenomenological philosopher, by characterizing him as a 
Husserlian who is involved in “a certain pragmatic application of phenomenological 
method” (Gallagher 2012, p.75). 
It is Merleau-Ponty’s view that he, unlike Husserl, is the most consistent of 
phenomenological philosophers and, as such, he grounds all of his philosophy 
phenomenologically. He does so in the sense that all conceptual distinctions must 
have phenomenological warrant, even the empirical-transcendental one. What this 
means is that on Merleau-Ponty’s view one is only warranted in making the 
distinction as an embodied situated subject, that is, perspectivally. And given this 
perspectival conception, any transcendental claims that he makes are always 
relativized to, and constrained by, the situated experience of a lived body-subject.13 
The effect of this is to relativize and historicize the distinction – some would say 
undermine it – and turn it into something quite different to Husserl’s ahistorical 
                                                
13 For example, he characterizes the philosophical problem of understanding the nature of visual perception as that of 
understanding ‘how vision can be brought into being from somewhere without being enclosed in its perspective' (Merleau-Ponty 
2002, p.78). As Sebastian Gardner observes: ‘vision must be relativized to something that is not a point in the world, that could 
itself become an object of vision or be located in objective, geometrically determined space, but that is nevertheless 
'somewhere', i.e. that has the perspectival character of a point’ (Gardner 2007, p.20). 
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empirical-transcendental distinction, with its corollary contingent-necessary, fact-
essence, relative-absolute structure. In his attempt to be consistently 
phenomenological throughout, Merleau-Ponty ends up making transcendental claims 
that are ultimately “contingent a priori” or “historical a priori”.14 Now, regardless of 
whether this account is or could be made defensible, given Merleau-Ponty’s radically 
consistent methodological commitment to “the principle of phenomenology” it is all 
he is able to claim.15 
How clear Merleau-Ponty was on this at the time of the writing of 
Phenomenology of Perception is a debated question, as he is less than fully explicit 
on the issue. He does, however, clarify his view in a discussion of the convergence 
between phenomenology and psychology in “Phenomenology and the Sciences of 
Man” (Merleau-Ponty 1964). Gallagher (2012) reads this discussion as addressing a 
convergence regarding “how phenomenology is put to use in the research fields of 
psychology and neuroscience … a convergence on a methodological plane” (p.75). 
Despite this convergence, Gallagher says that “the transcendental project remains 
as its own phenomenological project” (p.75). But reading Merleau-Ponty’s talk of 
convergence in this fashion involves a quarantining of the empirical from the 
transcendental that is Husserlian, not Merleau-Pontian. 
                                                
14 Joseph Margolis, for example, argues for a version of this view in ‘Phenomenology and Metaphysics: Husserl, Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty’ (Margolis1991).   
15 This pushes him in the direction of hermeneutics and, arguably, the Phenomenology is a text that is ‘on the way’ – well ‘on 
the way’ – to hermeneutic phenomenology. 
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Husserl characterizes the empirical-transcendental relation as a kind of 
“parallelism” (Merleau-Ponty 2002, p.58n45)16 where there are two sharply defined 
levels that directly parallel each other, e.g. the “transcendental ego”17 is the parallel 
of the “empirical ego”. But, for Merleau-Ponty, the phenomenology of the perception, 
the lived body, and the passive constitution of the background, by showing that 
subjectivity is intricately realized through a body that necessarily inheres in a “world”, 
makes this view untenable. Instead he ends up understanding the empirical-
transcendental relation in terms of the “founding-founded” model revealed by 
phenomenological analysis.18 Remember that his is a fully phenomenological theory 
so that when we make a transcendental claim we make it as a situated body-subject 
in a “world” and so our empirical experience (in the phenomenological sense, 
because under the reduction) has conditions of possibility that are necessary 
conditions that make being what it is possible. However, these constrained 
transcendental claims are relativized to the perspectival embodied subject. Thus, 
they cannot be transcendental in the same absolute, non-perspectival sense as 
Husserl’s. This is because a philosophy built out of the lived experience of the “body-
                                                
16 Husserl makes this parallelism claim in Ideas 1 and it is contestable as to whether it is applicable to his later genetic 
phenomenology. For the purposes of the present article, however, I leave aside the interesting question of the status of this 
claim vis a vis Husserl’s late work. 
17 Husserl’s term for the intentional centre of all conscious life: a reflecting subjectivity understood to transcendentally 
‘constitute’ the world of experience, including itself as an empirical ego on the world.   
18 Merleau-Ponty’s view here is complex but the basic idea is that the sharp distinction between claims regarding empirical facts 
as ‘probable’ and (transcendental) claims regarding essential structures as ‘certain’ is not defensible. This is because 
phenomenological analysis reveals that ‘reflection’ – the ‘founded’ – stands in a ‘two-way relation’ with ‘the unreflective’ – the 
‘founding’. The reflective articulation of an ‘essence’ must be understood as ‘an intellectual taking over, a making explicit and 
clarifying of something concretely experienced, and a recognition that it comes after something else, from which it starts is 
essential to its nature’ (Merleau-Ponty 1964, p.68). 
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subject” – as opposed to the “transcendental consciousness” of a metaphysical 
entity called the “transcendental ego” – is not entitled to such claims. 
The implication of this for Merleau-Ponty is that empirical and transcendental 
modes of enquiry and claims cannot ultimately be quarantined because they are 
bound together in a tight founding-founded relationship that is mutually reciprocally 
defining. So transcendental philosophy and cognitive science, on Merleau-Ponty’s 
conception, are not as easily cordoned off as Gallagher’s Husserlian characterization 
of the issue suggests. This is why Merleau-Ponty (2010) argues that “the distinction 
between phenomenology and psychology must not be presented as a rigid 
distinction” (p.329). Not only because of Gallagher’s “convergence on a 
methodological plane”, but also because this methodological convergence indicates 
a recasting of how we ought to think about the empirical-transcendental relation. For 
Merleau-Ponty, psychological studies draw attention to experiential material that 
necessitates a transcendental analysis in order to explore its conceptual 
presuppostions. And the conceptual base that structures the theorizing can only 
possibly be known to be adequate in connection to a close exploration of empirical 
detail that concretely tests out its applicability. 
At the end of The Structure of Behaviour (1963) Merleau-Ponty says that it is 
“necessary to define transcendental philosophy anew in such a way as to integrate 
with it the very phenomenon of the real” (p.224). Gallagher sees this statement as 
being consonant with his conception of a “naturalized phenomenology”. On his view, 
the effects of doing phenomenology in close concert with the cognitive sciences 
mean that the transcendental dimension of phenomenology will be necessarily 
modified as a result of accommodating the close concrete detail involved. Merleau-
Ponty, however, might justly protest that this programmatic statement from the last 
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page of The Structure of Behaviour lays out precisely what he takes himself to have 
achieved via the philosophical content of his subsequent book Phenomenology of 
Perception. And so he would view Gallagher’s characterization as not adequately 
acknowledging the way in which Merleau-Ponty “define[d] transcendental philosophy 
anew” in the Phenomenology.  
 
Conclusion   
The preceding analyses are hardly exhaustive of the varieties of moves made in 
post-cognitivism but they are at least suggestive of concerns that I think Merleau-
Ponty would have with the use of his phenomenology in these projects. On Merleau-
Ponty’s view, scientific enquiry plays a crucial role in helping bring to light and focus 
our attention on important features of the body and perception through a systematic 
and rigorous methodology that involves ascertaining patterns using perceptions 
within the natural attitude to check one another. These empirical patterns, however, 
ought to be integrated into a theory of human being in order for their full 
philosophical significance to be grasped. From this philosophical angle of vision 
Merleau-Ponty wants to argue that human beings cannot be adequately conceived 
as objects that have the property of consciousness. This is because our body is not 
an object; it is that which, due to its intrinsic ontological ambiguity,19 gives us our 
openness to objects and the world in which they appear. The structure of the body 
provides the contingent a priori body schema that structures our experience, and so 
any ontological meaning that we can arrive at is fundamentally dependent for its 
appearance on this body schema. On this account a scientific approach will 
                                                
19 See footnote 24. 
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ultimately be unable to do justice to consciousness because it presupposes an 
objectivism that is incapable of accounting for the essential features of lived 
experience: intentionality, meaning and normativity.  
It is only by taking a transcendental turn and problematizing these 
assumptions that the philosophical significance of empirical scientific studies can be 
properly drawn out. For Merleau-Ponty this means a way of theorizing that preserves 
the critical and experimental functions of scientific thinking and research, but that 
nonetheless doesn’t shy away from a reinterpretation of the transcendental meaning 
of empirical studies undertaken within the natural attitude.  
In different ways, the proposals that I have discussed represent a pattern of 
largely tacit de-transcendentalizing of his views that I think Merleau-Ponty would 
welcome as an innovative incorporation of phenomenology into the scientific 
exploration of consciousness. Nonetheless, he would be philosophically wary due to 
their potential to encourage an occlusion of the philosophical intent of the 
Phenomenology. The pattern involves an interpretation of the claims he makes in 
that text as those of a phenomenological psychology that does not take up a 
philosophically “critical” attitude. However effective the lines of argument proposed 
by Dreyfus, Gallagher and Varela, Thompson and Rosch are when viewed as 
arguments against representationalist approaches to perception within cognitive 
science, Merleau-Ponty would see his recruitment for this purpose as particularly 
worrisome if the reading of him as phenomenological psychologist were to promote 
the view that the reading of him as transcendental philosopher was in some sense 
redundant. The urgency of this concern is only sharpened when we realize that, 
unlike on the Husserlian model of the empirical-transcendental relation, on Merleau-
Ponty’s conception we cannot ultimately quarantine the empirical level from the 
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transcendental dimension. Thus, although he would certainly be an ally of the 
interdisciplinary cognitive sciences, he would be a very critical one.  
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